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We introduce a game inspired by the challenges of disease management in livestock farming
and the transmission of endemic disease through a trade network. Success in this game
comes from balancing the cost of buying new stock with the risk that it will be carrying some
disease. When players follow a simple memory-based strategy we observe a spontaneous
separation into two groups corresponding to players with relatively high, or low, levels of
infection. By modelling the dynamics of both the disease and the formation and breaking of
trade relationships, we derive the conditions for which this separation occurs as a function
of the transmission rate and the threshold level of acceptable disease for each player. When
interactions in the game are restricted to players that neighbour each other in a small-
world network, players tend to have similar levels of infection as their neighbours. We
conclude that success in economic-epidemiological systems can originate from misfortune
and geographical circumstances as well as by innate differences in personal attitudes towards
risk.
T
heoretical investigation into how diseases spread has been critical to our under-
standing of how to control outbreaks. In the past, mathematical models and agent
based simulations have provided essential insight into the relationship between human
behaviour and pathogen biology. Examples include the effect of contact heterogeneity
on the basic reproductive number of sexually transmitted diseases [1], the effect of net-
work topology on the the critical transmissibility at which contagions thrive [2], and the
conditions required for herd immunity to occur [3].
New questions emerge when we consider livestock diseases that spread over large
distances when animals are traded from one farm to another [4]. In many cases surveillance
and strict disease control measures are enforced to prevent epidemics from occurring,
although this does not always guarantee eradication and many diseases persist in the
population. Control of such endemic diseases therefore depends on action being taken by
individual farmers [5]. This prompts many questions about risk taking behaviour, and
how much farmers are willing to pay to avoid bringing disease onto their farm [6]. The
motivating question of the present work is this: what can be done to influence farmers to
behave in a way that leads to the eradication of an endemic disease?
When farmers react to a disease by changing their buying behaviour, the network of
potential transmission routes changes [7]. We therefore require a model that reflects this
interplay between contagion over the links of the network, and a network continuously
evolving in response to the disease. Such coevolution models have typically focused on
rewiring network links away from infected nodes towards those in a healthier state [8]. The
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livestock disease problem is distinctly different, as individuals may be willing to accept
some level of risk to avoid paying a higher price for a disease-free animal [9].
It is worth noting modelling work that concerns vaccination coverage and disease
spread. When most people are vaccinated, disease prevalence is zero and the risk is per-
ceived to be very low. For some this removes the incentive to vaccinate, reducing vaccine
uptake and leading to re-emergence of the disease [10]. This dynamic has motivated a
number of mathematical models, some incorporating the effects of social influence and
network structure [11,12]. As with vaccination, we expect farmers to be more risk averse
when they are more exposed to the disease [13]. Crucially, we also expect money to play
a role; for the right price some may be willing to take on a little more risk [14].
The challenge here is to reduce this problem to a set of rules and assumptions that
capture the interplay between perceived cost-benefit motivations, the dynamics of the
network, and the spread of disease. One way to achieve this is to frame the problem as
a game (for example [15]). In this paper we introduce a game played between a number
of people that recreates the kind of dilemma associated with trading livestock in the real
world. We describe one simple memory-based strategy for playing the game, and explore
the dynamics of the network structure and disease outcomes when all players follow it.
We observe a spontaneous divergence of disease status that splits the players into two
distinct groups. In Section 2 we derive an expression that describes the conditions of the
system that give rise to this divergence. In Section 2.5 we simulate the game on a small-
world substrate network and observe that homophily between the different behaviour
types emerges when spatial structure dominates.
1 Model
In our game there are N players. Each player has a number associated with them that
represents their level of sickness. For player i this number is xi(t) where t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}
denotes the round of the game. Each player also starts with a fixed budget represented by
a number of tokens. In each round of the game, each player privately chooses one other
player. Once every player has made their decision the choices are revealed to everyone.
Two exchanges then occur:
Exchange of money: every player i passes one token to j where j is the player chosen by
i unless i is the only player that chose j, in which case they pass none.
Exchange of sickness: each player i increases their sickness by βxj(t) where j is the player
chosen by i, while j reduces their their sickness by the same amount. (To avoid
xj(t + 1) < 0, if kj > 1/β, where kj is the number of players choosing j, then each
of them takes xj(t)/kj from j.)
If the sickness level of a player exceeds a specific value then they lose the game. The
objective of the game is to have the most tokens at the end of the final round.
The game is an abstract representation of the livestock trade system. The exchange
of money incorporates a simple mechanism of supply and demand into the model. The
effect of high demand is felt by a player when they encounter other players wanting to
buy from the same source as them. This creates an incentive to choose from players who
are unlikely to be chosen by others.
Sickness may represent any of a number of diseases or physical problems that decrease
the quality of the animals being traded. It is assumed here that a relatively small number
of sick animals is sustainable, but when this number crosses a particular threshold the
result is catastrophic to the individual. Note that the total sickness in the system does not
change from one round to the next. This “conservation law” assumes no births, deaths,
infections or recoveries, with sick animals following a diffusion-like process through the
system.
1.1 Strategy Before introducing the strategy we take a moment to consider how a ra-
tional person might approach this game. For simplicity we assume that players do not
communicate with each other in any way other than through the exchanges described in
the rules of the game. All they know is what choices they made in previous rounds and
the exchanges of sickness and tokens that resulted. They will therefore be able to estimate
with reasonable accuracy the sickness levels of the players they traded with in previous
rounds (they do not know exactly how many others chose the same as them). The remain-
ing players will have sickness levels distributed around the population mean. Through
their success or failure in retaining their tokens they will also have some indication of the
popularity of the individuals they previously chose.
Now imagine that you are playing the game. Which of the N − 1 other players will
you choose to buy from? Firstly, if retaining tokens is your priority then you will aim
to choose a player that nobody else does, since this minimizes the cost of buying new
animals. Disregarding any sickness concerns completely, we are left with a version of the
minority game [16], a game which is won by choosing the less popular of two options, and
has no rational solution (this has been adapted to allow more than two options [17]).
The additional incentive to avoid sickness provides a more stable criteria on which
players can base their decisions. For example, some players may prioritise their health
and aim to maintain a low sickness level. They will try to avoid players with relatively
large xi. Consequently the high sickness individual becomes more attractive to players
who prioritise their wealth. More generally there is a trade-off for each player between
the amount of health they are willing to sacrifice, and amount of wealth they aim to
accumulate.
We want to capture the essence of the health vs wealth trade-off in a strategy that can
be automated. We have chosen the following strategy for its simplicity and mathematical
tractability:
At t = 1, the player i chooses any player j 6= i randomly with equal probability.
For t > 1, supposing i chose j in round t−1 and kj(t−1) is the total number of
players that chose j, i will choose j again if, and only if, kj(t−1)+xj(t−1) <
1 + α where α ∈ (0, 1) is a constant. Otherwise they choose randomly.
From the point of view of the player, they will repeat their choice from the previous round
if that round was sufficiently successful. For this to be the case two things must be true:
they choose a player that no other player chooses, and the sickness level of that player is
less than a threshold α.
This is a reasonable strategy for a player who has a very short memory. Having saved
a token in the previous round it seems sensible to choose the same individual in the next
one (given that the sickness level is acceptable). We note that this logic does in fact hold
true in the case when every player on the game follows this same strategy. In this case
the player who was selected previously will not be a target for the fraction of players who
repeat their choice from the previous round, whereas a random player could be a target
for both random and repeated choices.
The parameter α can be interpreted as the maximum amount of sickness that players
are willing to accept in exchange for the increased probability of saving a token. Larger
values of α represent a higher value being placed on the accumulation of wealth at the
expense of also accumulating sickness at a faster rate. Lower values of α correspond to
higher priority being placed on health rather than wealth.
1.2 Spatial constraint network There are a many factors that influence the decisions made
by those involved in the trade of livestock. One that we wish to explore through this game
is the effect of geographical constraints. we consider the players to be located on a nodes
of a network and restrict the choices available to each player to those with whom they
share a connection. In the basic setup the game is played on a complete network, meaning
that there is an edge between every pair of individuals. In general we can use any network
structure.
In Setion 22.5 we limit our selection of networks to those generated by the Watts-
Strogatz model [18]. Networks are constructed by placing N nodes on a circle with the
same distance between each pair of neighbours. Edges are created between each node
and the k nearest nodes in the clockwise direction. Each of these edges is then rewired to
a random node with probability p. This creates a spatially embedded network in which
nodes have a location and a mixture of short and long distance connections. By varying the
parameters k and p we are able to generate a range of networks with varying connectivity
(i.e. the mean degree 2k) and spatial embedding (i.e. the number of connections that are
determined by proximity 1− p).
2 Results
We are interested in the network of trades that occur and the movement of sickness
between players of the game. We focus on deriving the degree distribution of the trade
network and the distribution of sickness. It is apparent that there will be a categorical
difference between players with sickness level xi < α and those with xi ≥ α. We therefore
consider the degree distribution and sickness distribution for the two cases separately
before considering the rate at which players move from one group to the other.
We start by defining some useful concepts.
Nodes and edges: We treat each player as a node, i, in a dynamic network, edges in the
network are directed; if i chooses j in one round of the game then there is an edge
from j to i.
Out-going degree: The number of edges going from i to any other node at the end of
round t of the game is its out-going degree, ki(t) which we shall refer to simply as
degree. Note that the in-coming degree is always 1.
Capacity: We say that the capacity ci of node i is the number of out-going edges it can
retain from one round to the next. This will be ci = 0 if xi > α and ci = 1 otherwise.
We use nc to denote the number of nodes that have capacity c.
Rewiring: We use this term to describe the change in position of an edge from one round
to the next.
In this section we derive an expression for the distribution of sickness values over the
population of players. There are several stages to this: we start by deriving the number of
rewired edges in a typical round, we then find the degree distribution, and finally derive
the sickness distribution.
2.1 Proportion of rewired edges We want to know the expected number of edges that are
free to rewire in each round. In round t this is Rt. Note that Rt is also the number of
nodes that do not retain an out-going edge from round t to round t+ 1. We have
Rt+1 −Rt = (N −Rt)
[
1−
(
1− 1
N
)Rt]
− (Rt − n0)Rt
(
1
N
)(
1− 1
N
)Rt−1
. (1)
The first term on the right hand side is the expected increase in Rt caused by edges
rewiring to nodes that have retained an edge from the previous round, thus pushing them
over their capacity and creating an additional rewired edge. It is the product of the
expected number of nodes that retain an edge, and the probability that at least one of the
rewired links rewires to such a node. The second term on the right hand side represents
the decrease caused by edges rewiring to nodes that have the capacity to hold an edge
but are currently unoccupied. This is the product of the number of such nodes and the
probability that exactly one edge will rewire to one such node.
We assume that there is an equilibrium solution Rt → R for large values of t. The
above equation then simplifies to
(N −R)
[
1−
(
1− 1
N
)R]
= (R− n0)R
N
(
1− 1
N
)R−1
(2)
We consider the proportion of nodes in the network that have zero capacity, λ = n0/N ,
and the proportion of edges that rewire each time-step, r = R/N . Using (1− 1/N)−R ≈
1 + r + r2/2 we arrive at
r ≈ −3 +
√
9 + 8(1 + λ)
2
(3)
for large values of N . The number of rewired edges, r, therefore depends only on the
proportion, λ of nodes that do not have the capacity to retain an edge form one round to
the next due to their high sickness level.
2.2 Degree distribution We now derive the degree distribution for the network. First, we
focus only on the rN free edges that are rewired from the previous round. The probability
qk that exactly k of these edges rewires to a given node i is the probability of k successes
out of rN in a Bernoulli process where probability of success is 1/N . Thus the variable
k follows a Binomial distribution, B(rN, 1/N) and since rN × 1/N converges as N →∞
it approximately follows the Poisson distribution: qk = e
−rrk/k!.
Here we derive the probability, pc(k), that a node that has capacity c has degree k.
For nodes with c = 0, simply p0(k) = qk. For those that do have the capacity to retain
an edge from the previous round, c = 1, we have to sum over the two possibilities, that
they are retaining an edge and that they are not. We therefore have
p1(0) =
r − λ
1− λq0 and p1(k) =
1− r
1− λqk−1 +
r − λ
1− λqk for k > 0
Combining the above with p0(k) = qk we get the full degree distribution
pc(k) =

e−rrk
k!
if c = 0
r − λ
1− λ
e−rrk
k!
[
1 +
(1− r)k
(r − λ)r
]
if c = 1
(4)
Using 〈kn〉c =
∑
knpc(k) to denote the nth moment, we have
〈k〉c =

r if c = 0
r +
1− r
1− λ if c = 1
(5)
and
〈k2〉c =

r(1 + r) if c = 0
1 + (2− λ)r − (1 + λ)r2
1− λ if c = 1
(6)
2.3 Sickness distribution We use xc(t) to denote the expectation of the sickness level of a
node with capacity c. Necessarily we have that x0(t) > α and x1(t) ≤ α. The changes to
these values are described by the following relationship
xc(t+ 1)− xc(t) = −βxc(t)〈k〉c + βrλx0(t) + β(1− rλ)x1(t) (7)
The first term on the right hand side describes the expected amount of sickness that the
node will pass to others. The second and third terms represent the expected amount that
they will receive from others given the respective probabilities of choosing a node with
c = 1 or c = 0.
We assume that the mean sickness level of nodes will converge to one of two values
corresponding to whether they have the capacity to retain an outgoing edge, or not, i.e
x0(t) → µ0 and x1(t) → µ1. In this limit, the two equations above can be reduced
to µ0〈k〉0 = µ1〈k〉1. Combining this with the expression for the mean sickness 〈x〉 =
λµ0 + (1− λ)µ1 = 1/2 we find
µ0 =
1− λr
2(r + λ− 2rλ) and µ1 =
(1− λ)r
2(r + λ− 2rλ) (8)
The full distribution of sickness values is not easy to obtain, however, we are able
to find an expression for the nth moment, which we then use to calculate σc, the stan-
dard deviation of the sickness distribution for nodes with capacity c, and use a Normal
approximation to the distribution.
Letting ρc(x, t) be the probability density function for the sickness level x at time t
for individuals with capacity c. In general, we can find ρc(x, t) by solving
ρc(x, t) =
∫
ρc(x
′, t− 1)Pr(xt = x|xt−1 = x′)dx′. (9)
The right hand side integrates over all possible states at round t multiplied by the prob-
ability of mapping from that state exactly on to x at the next round. In our case, this
transition probability is
Pr(xt+1 = x|xt = x′) =
∞∑
k=0
pc(k) [rλδ(x− (1− βk)x′ − βµ0) + rλδ(x− (1− βk))x′ − βµ1)]
(10)
Where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function. The above expression is broken down as follows:
pc(k) is the probability that a node has k outgoing edges, rλ is the probability that
i has a free link and that it rewires to one of the nodes with c = 0. The sickness
acquired in either case is here approximated to be the mean of the group µ0 or µ1.
Substituting this into (9), solving the integral, and the assuming the system converges to
ρc(x, t) = ρc(x, t− 1) = ρc(x), we get
ρc(x) =
∞∑
k=0
pc(k)(1− βk)−1
[
rλρc
(
x− βµ0
1− βk
)
+ (1− rλ)ρc
(
x− βµ1
1− βk
)]
. (11)
Multiplying the above expression through by xn and integrating over the full range of x
we have ∫ ∞
−∞
xnρc(x)dx =
∞∑
k=0
pc(k)(1− βk)−1
[
rλ
∫ ∞
−∞
xnρc
(
x− βµ0
1− βk
)
dx
+(1− rλ)
∫ ∞
−∞
xnρc
(
x− βµ1
1− βk
)
dx
]
.
(12)
Figure 1: The distribution of sickness values. Simulation results for for N = 100 β = 0.05. The left
panel shows the time-series for 10 randomly selected nodes and the derived mean sickness values
from Eq. (8) (λ is computed at t = 103). On the right, the frequency distribution of sickness values
of all nodes at t = 1000, 1100, ..., 5000 is shown for in bins of width 0.01. The curve shows Nρc(x)
where ρc(x) is the analytically derived Normal approximation given in Eq. (16).
With substitutions of the form u = (x − βµ)/(1 − βk), each integral in the expression
above can be rewritten
(1− βk)−1
∫ ∞
−∞
xnρ
(
x− βµ
1− βk
)
dx =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− βk)i(βµ)n−i
∫ ∞
−∞
uiρ(u)du. (13)
Then, using the notation mc(n) =
∫
xnρc(x)dx for the nth moment of ρc, the above
expression becomes
mc(n) =
∞∑
k=0
pc(k)
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− βk)i [rλ(βµ0)n−i + (1− rλ)(βµ1)n−i]mc(i) (14)
With mc(0) = 1, we can check easily that mc(1) = µc. The second moment is then found
to be
mc(2) =
[rλµ20 + (1− rλ)µ21]β + 2[rλµ0 + (1− rλ)µ1](1− β〈k〉c)mc(1)
2〈k〉c − β〈k2〉c (15)
The variance of the distribution is σ2c = mc(2)−µ2c . We then use the Normal distribution
ρc(x) ≈ 1√
2piσ2c
exp
(
−(x− µc)
2
σ2c
)
(16)
as an approximation.
Figure 1 tracks the sickness level of 10 (out of 100) players over the course of the game
and the mean values given analytically by Eq. (8). The curves shown in the right panel
are estimates of the frequency of nodes with a given sickness level, N × ρc(x).
2.4 Disease status divergence We address two questions: what proportion of nodes will
go into the high sickness group, and under what values of α and β does the system
spontaneously divide into two distinct sickness distributions? For the first question we
are able to get an approximate solution assuming the two sickness distributions are Normal
and express the stability of the system as a function of λ (the proportion of nodes that
do not have capacity to retain an edge). For the second question we derive a formula
from the Normal approximation that divides the parameter space into a region in which
divergence is not likely to occur, and a region where it is.
The Normal approximation provides an estimate of the rate at which nodes switch
from having c = 0 to c = 1 and vice-versa. This switch occurs when a the fluctuations in
the sickness level of a node i with ci = 0 (ci = 1) cause xi to go below (above) α, which
is most likely to happen when the mean µ0 is only a small number of standard deviations
above (below) α. We use pi01, to denote our estimate of the probability that a node i will
change from ci = 0 to ci = 1. Assuming the system has converged to its steady state and
the Normal approximation is valid, we have
pi01(λ) =
∫ α
−∞
ρ0(x)dx =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
α− µ0
σ0
√
2
)]
(17)
where erf(·) is the error function. Similarly for transitions in the opposite direction we
have
pi10(λ) =
∫ ∞
α
ρ1(x)dx =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
µ1 − α
σ1
√
2
)]
. (18)
In Fig. 2A we use an energy landscape to visualise the stability and convergence of
the system. The potential energy of the state of the system (i.e. λ α, β), is defined as
E(λ) = −
∫ λ
λ0
lpi01(l)− (1− l)pi10(l)dl. (19)
It is a measure of the amount of external “work” required to move the system from an
arbitrary reference point λ0 to the state λ; since the expected change from on round to the
next is ∆(λ) = λpi01 − (1 − λ)pi10, the work required to increase λ by a given arbitrarily
small amount is proportional to −∆(λ). The energy is then the sum of all the forces
required to move from λ0 to λ. The potential energy at different values of λ are plotted
in Fig. 2. Visually the line can be seen as a landscape where work is required to go uphill,
and the natural course for the system is to converge to a low energy state.
At the beginning of the game all nodes will with have capacity to retain an edge and
λ = 1 (if α > 1/2) or they will not and λ = 0 (if α ≥ 1/2). The division into two groups
therefore begins as soon one node transitions to the other which has probability
pi =
1
2
[
1− erf
(
(1− 2α)√a− bβ√
c
√
β
)]
(20)
with the constants a = 1, b = 1 and c = 1 if α < 1/2 and a = 4, b = 5
√
17 − 17,
c = 10
√
17− 38 if α ≥ 1/2.
The probability that division does not occur in say T rounds of the game is ap-
proximated by p = (1 − pi)NT ; this assumes each round independently draws from the
appropriate Normal distribution; however, this will be an overestimate since the variance
starts at 0 in the first round and converges to its steady-state value σ2c . For a given value
of p, it follows from the above equation that division will occur in the first T rounds of
the game with probability p if
β >
a
b+ c(z/1− 2α)2 (21)
where z = erf−1(2p1/NT − 1).
Figure 2: Convergence and division for different parameter combinations. A. The energy landscape
given by Eq.(19) for selected values of α and β. The system is expected to change in the direction
of the slope of the curve. Local minima are therefore the stable equilibria of the system. B. Regions
of parameter space where divergence of disease status does or does not happen over the first 100
rounds of the game. The grey region marks where the simulation remained in its initial state i.e
λ = 1 if α < 1/2 or λ = 0 otherwise. The curve shows Eq. (21) the analytical approximation to this
region.
Shown in Fig. 2 are the results from simulations of 100 rounds of the game. We also
show Eq. (20) for p = 1/2, to indicate the region where divergence of disease status is
more likely to happen than not. The Normal distribution overestimates the probability
density in the left tail and underestimates it in the right tail. Thus, pi01(0) is larger than
it would be if the approximation was more accurate, and so in the case where α < 1/2,
divergence is predicted to occur for parameter combinations that do not diverge in the
simulation. Similarly, when α > 1/2, pi10(1) is larger than it should be and divergence
occurs in places where the analytical result suggests it will not.
2.5 Spatial constraint network We ask how spatial constraints on the choices of the players
affect the distribution of sickness values. Fig. 3A shows some examples of the networks
generated using the Watts-Strogatz model The disease simulation was performed on the
network for 100 rounds with α = 0.5 and β = 0.05 and the resulting sickness values of each
node is also shown. The examples shown demonstrate that sickness is most concentrated
in localized regions of the spatial network when edges more constrained; nodes with high
levels of sickness tend to be connected to others with high levels of sickness.
Fig. 3B shows this neighbourhood effect between sickness more formally. Here each
pixel represents a different combination of p and k. A network was generated for each
combination, the simulation was then performed on the network and the slope of the least
squares regression between the sickness of a node and the mean sickness of its neighbours
calculated. This was repeated 100 times and the mean taken.
As the mean degree increases (increasing the number number of options available to
each player) the correlation between the sickness of neighbours decreases until a nodes
location does not have any effect on its sickness value. We also see that when choice
is highly constrained (low p and low k), the addition of a small number of long-range
(rewired) edges can be effective in mitigating this neighbourhood effect.
Figure 3: Simulation over a spatially constrained network A. Examples of the distribution of sickness
after simulation of the game over small world networks. B. Each pixel shows the neighbourhood
effect for a different combination of the mean degree and the proportion of long-range connections p.
Dark regions show where the neighbourhood effect is highest implying that the disease is clustered
in localized regions of the spatial network.
3 Discussion
We have described a game inspired by the challenges of livestock management where the
financial cost of disease is a major incentive to take precautions when buying. Through
the dynamics of the game, players encounter situations where they must decide between
prioritising wealth over health, bringing them closer to catastrophic levels of sickness, or
prioritising their health over wealth, and gaining less financially.
When all players follow a simple strategy, only changing their choice from the previous
round if it was detrimental to their health or their wealth, the population is likely to
separate into two distinct groups: one with a relatively high level of sickness compared to
the other. Whether or not the separation occurs depends on two parameters: the amount
of disease that individual players consider to be excessive, and the amount of sickness
transmitted in one transaction.
Players in one group are identical to those in the other regarding how they make
decisions; the divergence happens because the disease status of a player affects how they
are perceived by others. After a transaction, the buyer learns the sickness level of the
seller and decides whether to return to them in the next round. This results in a kind
of virtuous (or vicious) cycle that drives the divergence of the groups. Players with good
health status are rewarded by being chosen more frequently, they transmit more of their
sickness up to the less healthy group, while those in the high sickness group are chosen
less frequently causing the outward flow of sickness to be slower in comparison.
One might suspect that the configuration of edges in the first round determines the
fate of each player but this is not always the case; under some circumstances the sickness
distribution remains unimodal for some time before random fluctuations drive it towards a
more stable bimodal state. The idea that structure can emerge from a homogeneous start-
ing configuration without any external forces shaping it is known as symmetry breaking,
and is associated with spontaneous pattern formation in biological systems [19].
The model provides a basis for exploring the role of space and network structure
on contagion dynamics. In addition to the possibility that random chance fluctuations,
rather than players strategy, can determine the fate of the population, we have seen also
that the location of the player within a spatially constrained network can also be a factor.
This is due to a neighbourhood effect and the fact that in this model the total amount
of disease is conserved. As the sickness begins to aggregate in particular region of the
network, those within that region become exposed to a greater number of high sickness
options and fewer healthy players to choose from. While long range connections typically
increase the risk of an epidemic (e.g [7]), in this model they mitigate the neighbourhood
effect which helps avoid extreme levels being reached by any one player.
Returning to the motivating question, what can be done to influence farmers to behave
in a way that leads to the eradication of an endemic disease? In our model we found
that a small change in α can potentially make a dramatic difference in how disease is
distributed across the population. Recall that this parameter represents the maximum
amount of sickness players will tolerate before deciding to look elsewhere for a better
trading relationship. Our results strengthen the argument that small differences in the
general attitude of the farming community towards endemic disease can make a large
difference to its prevalence.
An obvious limitation of the strategy we have chosen to investigate is that very little
information is used by the players. More complex strategies could be explored that
use the history of choices and outcomes, such as those that have been applied to the
minority game [16,20]. These strategies are allowed to evolve over time in with mutations,
reproduction, and extinction, analogous to biological evolution [21]. Decisions could also
be informed by information about other players. If the game was played over a table,
for example, players will see the trades being made by others and be able to infer second
order information from the activity they observe. In the context of livestock trade it
is not known exactly how information spreads, however, we suspect that the networks
over which information transmits will strongly influence the pattern of trading and the
progression of endemic diseases [22,23].
This work provokes ideas that could potentially be tested either experimentally or
through observation, directly, or in data such as the cattle movement databases that now
exist across many countries. Analysis of the decisions made by human players could be
compared with more traditional measures of risk taking [24]. Discrete choice experiments,
for example, offer a way to assess the willingness of individuals to pay for livestock of
differing levels of health [25,26].
The challenge, ultimately, is to find ways to control and eradicate endemic disease
by influencing the behaviour of individuals. Our results show that this may be possible.
Nudges towards more congenial behaviour can be magnified by the feedback loop between
behaviour and disease spread. Exploiting this effect can push the system towards a stable
equilibrium that yields a better payoff for the population as a whole.
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